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Defining human-animal chimeras and hybrids: A comparison 
of legal systems and natural sciences 
Szymon Bokota1 
Abstract 
The article aims to present issues arising out of differences in the way that the terms chimera and hybrid are defined 
in legal systems and by natural sciences in the context of mixing human and animal DNA. The author analyses the 
different approaches to defining these terms used in various legal systems, dividing them into groups in light of 
conclusions reached from examining definitions used in natural sciences. The distinction is used to answer the 
question of which approach to definitions applied by legislators is the best way to handle the subject of human-
animal organisms, given the need to balance their impact on medicine and the ethical concerns that arise.  
Keywords: chimeras, hybrids, human-animal organism, legal definition, legislation 
Introduction 
The issue of beings with mixed human and animal elements is becoming one of the primary 
subjects of analysis in bioethics. We are also expecting legislators to start confronting that 
challenge, due to the impact of this type of research on science and the moral dilemmas 
connected with it. The methods of dealing with the issue of chimeras and hybrids (I will explore 
aspects of this distinction further below) are diverse. I want to present the various approaches 
to how these are defined (if at all) in several different legal systems. I decided to present 
examples from these systems, because in my opinion it is the best way to analyse the legislative 
techniques while commenting on their benefits and shortcomings. I also provide basic 
information on legal definitions and introduce a more general concept of mixed organisms 
before going on to present more specialised definitions and the consequences that result from 
them. 
Role and aspects of legal definitions 
Legal definitions are always at risk of being flawed or outdated. An endless stream of debates 
in the history of legal doctrine – such as the textual and intentional approach to the interpretation 
of disputed rules – clearly demonstrates that, despite a long history of language, law, and the 
tools related to them, there is no convincing way of creating perfect legal definitions. A legal 
definition is simply a definition that is worded by a legislator, placed in a legal act and used to 
give a specific meaning to a word or term used in the legal act (Malinowski, 2005, p. 215). 
As Lawrence M. Solan stated: “Most battles over legal interpretation are battles about the 
meanings of words” (Solan, 2001, p. 244). To prevent situations that are unclear from a 
linguistic perspective, the legislator often introduces legal definitions. Legal definitions are 
useful in law for many reasons – their existence helps to correctly interpret the legislator’s 
intention, to remove problems with the correct meaning and to make regulation more accessible 
(Bielska-Brodziak, 2008, pp. 159–174). They are beneficial both to the legislator and the 
subjects of law as a method of explaining an ambiguous word (Macagno, 2010, pp. 199–217). 
The structure of a definition, and simultaneously the reason for creating them rose “from two 
requirements that law must accommodate: logical consistency in expression and flexibility of 
application” (Jackson, 1985, pp. 377–386). Difficulties with law often come from the various
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possible understandings of a word, so legal definitions are helpful for lawyers to unify meaning. 
The legislator often complies with the requirement of legal certainty of a normative text, and 
legal definitions are a very reliable technique for avoiding confusion and manipulation (Sobolev, 
2015, pp. 168–180). 
In very specialised areas like biotechnology, legal definitions can also be the optimal and 
perhaps the only solution to introducing a preferred meaning to lawyers or subjects of law – 
phrases used in these regulations are not a part of commonly used language, and therefore 
leaving them without an understandable definition could be harmful and produce endless 
disputes about the correct meaning. To give a better look at the importance of legal definitions 
and their relationship with reality, I will introduce some more statements from the doctrine. The 
cited examples will also point to the fact that legal definitions are not a flawless solution to all 
interpretational dilemmas. 
One author analyses the relation between everyday language and the language of law and 
lawyers. He concludes that legal definitions are not ideal because legislative technique forbids 
them from being used too frequently and it is not possible to define every word. In addition, to 
introduce a legal definition is to introduce a new word, which can itself need an explanation 
(Opałek et al., 1969, p. 43). The verbal character of legal definitions – they are not statements 
of fact – is their disadvantage (Huntington, 1936, pp. 1099–1106). On a more positive note, 
another author considers them to be a valuable method for the legislator to make contact with 
the reader of a legal act. He presents three main reasons to use legal definitions: 
- they give meaning to terms used in law and provide conditions to consider a situation,
an entity or an object as the subject that a certain legal provision is dealing with, 
- they eliminate the ambiguity of words with more than one meaning,
- in some cases, the legislator needs to establish a very precise meaning of the word
(Zieliński, 2012, pp. 198–200). 
Legal definitions are also a way not to only clarify a potentially ambiguous meaning of a 
word, but also to introduce a new meaning or even a completely new term (Bartoszewicz, 2018, 
p. 356).
As the research of Agnieszka Bielska-Brodziak shows, there are some concerns with legal
definitions. Her research discusses a different understanding of them by representatives of the 
doctrine and the courts – for example, in one of the cited judgements, the Polish constitutional 
court denied that one of the provisions, despite looking like a legal definition (“A business trip 
is…” – File reference of the judgment: 2002 T 69/01, OTK-B 2002/2/118, ruling of Polish 
Constitutional Court), is not. in fact. a legal definition. The author groups concerns about legal 
definitions into three types: 
- Problems with formulating legal definitions, placing them in regulations and
recognising them as legal definitions (this problem is also underlined by Paweł Saługa (Saługa, 
2008, p. 76). 
- Problems with the interpretation of legal definitions.
- Problems with the scope of their application (Bielska-Brodziak, 2008, p. 159).
The presented information about legal definitions explains why they are so important and
what their disadvantages are. No matter what is being defined, there is a considerable possibility 
that the legal definition will at some point not be sufficiently precise or will not fully reflect 
reality. This situation certainly appears in the case of beings with mixed human and animal 
DNA. 
Chimeras and hybrids 
Chimeric and hybrid organisms, being one that combines human and non-human DNA, are 
nowadays one of the most problematic aspects of bioethics. A chimera is an organism that 
contains cells, tissues, genes or even organs and body parts of another organism (Greely, 2003, 
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pp. 17–20) – in the analysed case, a chimera mixes cells from a human and non-human being. 
A hybrid is the result of impregnating the egg cell of one species with semen from another 
species (Bonnicksen, 2009, p. 59).  
Arguments supporting and prohibiting the creation of these are numerous on both sides. Due 
to the scale and complexity of the argumentation, I will restrict myself to introducing just a few 
key points. I selected these arguments because they show the most visible advantages and 
disadvantages of creating such beings. Moreover, the mentioned arguments are frequently cited 
in literature. They show why mixed beings have already had an impact on our reality and what 
their prospects are, but also arguments from the other side that underline the dangers that are 
discussed in bioethical discourse. For example, creating these organisms is useful for the 
purposes of drug testing, analysing the development of diseases (Huther, 2009, p. 83), or even, 
in the future, for transplanting organs from non-human donors (De Los Angeles et al., 2018, p. 
335). As we can see, the main goal behind creating mixed beings is to achieve medical solutions. 
The history of successful experiments with implementing human genes into an animal genome 
starts back in the 1980s (Hanahan et al., 2007, pp. 2258–2270). The creation of animals with 
some human genes resulted in the possibility to fight against cancer, HIV and Ebola, or to test 
new methods of diagnostics (Walsh et al., 2017, pp. 187–215). These organisms are helpful in 
research about cells (Levine et al., 2017, p. 131), or when scientists try to understand certain 
human evolutionary mechanisms (Shi et al., 2019, pp. 480–481). 
On the other hand, there are dilemmas like the enigmatic status of an entity that combines 
human and non-human DNA, the moral issue of using foetus stem cells, questions about human 
dignity, and the so-called “yuck factor” (Huther, 2009, p. 60). The welfare of animals with a 
modified genome is another problematic aspect – a good example is the case of the Beltsville 
pigs, which started to suffer from unexpected sicknesses after being implanted with human 
genes (Mann et al., 2019, p. 6).  
Moreover, there are also many fields that we can consider as grey areas. These organisms 
can be created in different ways – less or more “moral” – and developed to different stages of 
life. Moreover, many ethical dilemmas are now rather theoretical, but they are starting to be 
revealed in our world in very real shape – like creating animals with cognitive skills closer to 
humans than in natural order. Considering that future human-animal organisms might possibly 
have better intellectual abilities (Shi et al., 2019, pp. 489–490), or even a visual resemblance to 
people (Bourret et al., 2016, p. 5), there are certainly a lot of doubts. As research on the 
arguments used in the debate about mixing human and animal DNA shows, there are multiple 
reasons to create mixed beings or to question the ethicality of their creation. These arguments 
are very varied – from moral or theological to pure consideration of negative consequences 
from biological view (Kwisda et al., 2020, p. 1). 
The name chimera – which is more popular, because human–animal hybrids are currently 
much less real, and experiments involving their creation have no scientific justification – has 
come a long way. 2 Now we consider chimeras to be a part of the natural sciences. However, 
the first descriptions of chimera are based on mythology, where the original Chimera was a 
monster combining the body parts of a lion, a goat, and a snake. A chimera in Greek mythology 
was a symbol of disaster (Kuře, 2009, p. 8), but was also associated with the seasons of the year 
2 “At present there appears to be no rationale for creating animal-human hybrids in research. Members of the group 
that produced the U.K. report on humans and chimeras “were of the opinion that there is no scientific case for true 
interspecies hybrids” (U.K. Department of Health 2007b, Appendix H 5.7–5.9). The Wellcome Trust conveyed the 
same message: “full sexual hybrids between human and animal gametes would not develop beyond early 
preimplantation stages. It is hard to see what scientific information would be gained from such an experiment” 
(United Kingdom. Parliament 2007a). If there were some reason to combine human and nonhuman biological 
properties, this would be done by other methods such as transgenics, not by hybridization. Nevertheless, perhaps 
in order to protect flexibility in research, the U.K. House of Commons defeated a proposed ban on the creation of 
human-nonhuman hybrids in 2008 (Henderson and Elliott, 2008)” (Bonnicksen, 2009, p. 62). 
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as something that combines different states (Graves, 2017, p. 130). The meaning of chimera 
evolved and by the Middle Ages had become not only an obvious representation of unholy 
forces, but also the name in medieval logic for an object that does not exist (Roberts, 1960, p. 
274). Further sections will examine possible definitions of chimeras in interesting contexts, but 
now we can simplify it to an organism with cells from at least two different species. 
Hybrids are not as problematic to define, though there are voices pointing to the fact that 
there is more than one possible understanding of hybrids in terms of mixing human and animal 
material (Kuře, 2009, p. 5). In fact, hybrids are not a very big part of modern research, so before 
examining legal definitions and definitions from natural sciences, we can consider them simply 
as a result of combining gametes from two different species. 
In recent decades, research on chimeric entities has significantly accelerated – in 1961, 
Andrzej Tarkowski developed the first chimeric mice. By 2019, we had animals with superior 
cognitive skills due to the human gene implemented in them. The law eventually started to 
confront the issue of chimeras, which became an important part of medical research and ethical 
analysis – but it is also hard to expect that legislators will be able to answer every question 
associated with such a complicated matter. The law almost always tries to match progression in 
the real world, and we can see this also in the case of beings with mixed DNA. To name a few 
current examples where the legislator was forced to prepare new rules after a new situation 
occurred, we can mention cryptocurrency or drones. In my opinion, the consequences of 
developing chimeras in future can be much more complicated than in the cited examples. 
The issue of mixing the DNA of different species goes much further than only aspects related 
to human DNA. Multiple other types of mixed organisms – like animal-animal chimeras, plant 
chimeras, or the effects of microbiological manipulation also have a huge impact on the shape 
of the world. They provide numerous advantages and disadvantages, which should be noted. 
However, due to the especially problematic ethical character of human-animal beings, I decided 
only to analyse these entities and the rules concerning them in legal acts. It is no coincidence 
that legislators often directly refer to chimeras and hybrids with human elements, but this will 
be properly presented in the later part of the article. 
In later parts of the article, I will compare the regulations about chimeras and hybrids – 
mainly definitions – in various legal systems and in natural sciences. Based on the results of 
this comparison, I will try to answer the question about the best possible definition of a chimera, 
or even the need to define a chimera in law. 
What do the natural sciences say? 
Natural sciences is a broad term and, due to main subject of the article, I will focus only on the 
selected definition of chimera and hybrid from them – I do not think that it is even possible to 
list every proposed definition of these organisms. We can agree that there exists a simplified 
and working definition – “an organism with cells from two genetically different sets of parents 
in its body” referring to a chimera. Despite the cited definition, concerns are also expressed 
about different understandings of chimeras in different sciences – “molecular biologists, 
geneticists, cell biologists, embryologists and other academic specialists attaching somewhat 
different definitions” (Bonnicksen, 2009, p. 27). The cited sentence is not the only situation 
when the definition of chimera, even in the context of only pure biology, is considered to be 
complex and multiple (Huther, 2009, p. 1). 
As an example of the presented thesis that the terms chimera and hybrid have different or 
specialised meanings in different natural sciences, I will provide some selected definitions 
divided into scientific categories, with a focus on chimera, as it is more frequently discussed in 
terms of its precise meaning. 
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Genetics: “Chimeras are hybrid products between multiple parent sequences that can be 
falsely interpreted as novel organisms, thus inflating apparent diversity” (Haas et al., 2011, p. 
494). 
Embryology: “Churchill’s Medical Dictionary (1989) defines a chimera as: ‘an organism 
composed of two or more genetically distinct cell types.’ In her review of the biology of human 
chimeras known in 1983, Tippett (1983) says: ‘a chimera has cells from two or more zygotes.’ 
The definition in Churchill’s Medical Dictionary (1989) mentions somatic mutation as a 
possible source of chimerism, but goes on to say: ‘it occurs in humans most commonly when 
the blood of dizygous twins mixes in utero.’ The definition in the Online Medical Dictionary 
(2004) does not mention mixing bloods, but offers a fusion of embryos first among the possible 
origins suggested” (Boklage, 2006, p. 580).  
Transplantology: “The world ‘chimerism’ is used in this review to describe the existence in 
a recipient of haemopoietic elements from a donor that is allogeneic or xenogeneic to the 
recipient. In our terminology ‘microchimerism’ refers to chimerism that is not measurable by 
flow cytometry (FCM) (which usually has a detection limit in the range of 0.1–1%), and 
requires sensitive techniques, such as a polymerase chain reaction (PCR), for its detection. 
‘Mixed chimerism’, the topic of this review, refers to a state in which donor and host 
haemopoietic elements of multiple lineages coexist at levels detectable by FCM. ‘Full 
chimerism’, on the other hand, is a state in which essentially all haemopoietic elements are 
derived from donor stem cell inoculum” (Sykes, 2001, p. 417). 
Medicine: “In medicine, an individual whose body contains different cell populations 
derived from different zygotes of the same or different species is defined as chimera, whereas 
a mosaic is an individual with two genetically distant types of cell that originates from a single 
zygote. In contrast to this, a hybrid is an individual composed of a single cell population derived 
from one zygote created by parents from two different breeding lines, races or species” 
(Weschka, 2009, p. 35).  
As the cited examples say, there is no one correct understanding of the term “chimera” in 
natural sciences – a term that law must adapt in one covering meaning. In addition, there is an 
aspect of detailed definitions like the mentioned microchimerism. We can, however, notice the 
shared core in a requirement of mixing cells from different organisms. However, if we try to go 
further from this point, then we must admit that there is not one accepted definition of “chimera” 
or “hybrid” in the world of natural sciences (Kuře, 2009, p. 5). Nevertheless, when we refer to 
chimeras or hybrids, we have intuition about what we are debating, or we can even use some 
simplified, widely accepted definitions.  
The legislator is forced to refer to one meaning or to enumerate situations. The wording of a 
legal act shapes the scope of permissible and impermissible actions. As a result, a definition 
forms specific orders and prohibitions, permissions and obligations. This is the main difference 
between legal discourse and other discourses, and that includes discourse in natural sciences. 
In the case of chimeras and hybrids, the simplified meaning can be used, or variants of mixed 
beings can be enumerated without going into dialogue with the various natural sciences.3  
It hard to negate the fact that the law must confront the problem of chimeric or hybrid entities. 
The law is an institution that must keep up with the shape of the modern world in order to be 
relevant and to work. One of the methods of slowing down progression is to completely shut 
down some type of research, though in the aftermath, it may result in being a dead end, 
especially considering how much potential is in research on chimeras and hybrids. On the other 
hand, the moral implications of these experiments are complicated and without consensus, as 
was stated in the earlier part of research in this area. 
3  Constanze Huther dedicated a chapter to provide and discuss several arguments against chimeras and 
counterarguments (Huther, 2009, pp. 49–114). 
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I do not think that the law must perfectly reflect the world of natural sciences in regulations. 
I do not even think it can perfectly reflect the world of natural sciences. This is not possible due 
to a plethora of biological meanings of chimeras or hybrids, and the fact that the law operates 
on a more abstract level as a set of rules – a regulation that divides mixed beings in an 
embryological meaning and in a genetic meaning will be illegible and would not work better 
than regulation with a definition that simplifies these beings. The correct definition of a chimera 
or hybrid is built on negating dangers and creating space for ethical and useful research on them. 
Of course, there is still the question as to what constitutes ethical and useful research, but that 
is a topic for much more extensive research. The fact is that research on chimeras and hybrids 
is common and it is still developing (Bonnicksen, 2009, p. 2). Now, when the issue of different 
definitions of human–animal beings across the sciences is underlined, we should see how the 
legislator is trying to define these organisms. 
Chimera and hybrid in legal systems – defined, not defined, over-defined? 
The issue of human-animal entities is barely touched on by the rules of the European Union, 
meaning that there is no definition in any directives or other acts of European law. Given that 
there are no explicit regulations for chimeras and hybrids in EU Law, at most we have to analyse 
more general regulations, such as those concerning clinical tests, public health, animal welfare 
or the status of human DNA. There are no binding documents even in international law 
(Taupnitz, 2009, pp. 450–451). 
As I will show, this leads to a situation where the legislation on this topic is not uniform 
among European Union Member States (and, for the record, not only in Europe). The question 
of whether it is possible to establish a fully uniform definition of chimeras is one that only the 
natural sciences can answer; certainly from a legal point of view there are very different ways 
in which chimeras and hybrids can be presented in law. After analysing various legal systems, 
I isolated three options of treating these organisms in legal acts.  
To begin with, there is an interesting but worrying attempt to not even to try to define a 
chimera or hybrid. That means the legislator is using the term “chimera” and “hybrid”, 
introducing them to the world of law, but without defining what is meant by the term or 
clarifying how it is understood in the given legislative context4. Spain, where the relevant 
regulations – Law 14/2006 of 26 May 2006, on techniques of assisted human reproduction5 and 
Law 14/2007, of 3 July 2007, on Biomedical Research6 – use the term hybrid and clarify hybrid 
by using the word “interspecies” in order to prohibit their creation, with the exception of cases 
mentioned elsewhere in the legal act. This situation causes many problems even before we 
analyse other regulations, doctrine and jurisprudence. Without a definition of hybrid, we do not 
know whether the term covers also a chimera (because chimeras, as beings originating by 
mixing cells, are different from hybrids as products of insemination – we do not know whether 
the legislator was simply trying to cover a wide range of human-animal organisms in one word), 
which is precisely what a hybrid is, and in what context we should try to find the meaning of 
the term hybrid. For example – if there is no distinction between chimera and hybrid, then a 
person implanted with a heart valve of animal origin could be examined in light of this 
definition of a hybrid being. Despite a distinction in natural sciences between chimera and 
hybrid (Pietrzykowski, 2017, p. 48), we cannot be sure that the legislator also applies this 
distinction. Of course, the law cannot define every word used in acts, propose a meaning in a 
4  In these cases, a useful tool for interpretation can be legislative materials. Problems of their usage were 
comprehensively discussed by Agnieszka Bielska-Brodziak (Bielska-Brodziak, 2017). 
5 (Article 26 c) 7 – “The production of interspecific hybrids using human genetic material, except in the cases of 
currently permitted trials”. 
6 “The production of interspecific hybrids that use human genetic material, except for the provisions of the Law 
on Assisted Human Reproduction Techniques”. 
107 
statutory glossary or be overly enumerative. The model used in Spain causes disorientation 
because of the lack of a definition or other rules that give a better perspective on the nature of 
a mixed being. After reading the mentioned legal acts, it is only clear that hybrids are banned. 
On the other hand, not having a legal definition of a hybrid (or a chimera), considering 
developments in biotechnological research, can lead to many unclear situations. I would call 
this type of dealing with the issue of mixed beings the “silent approach”. While the lack of a 
regulation or definition from legislator may be intentional, it certainly generates problems for 
subsequent interpreters (Bielska-Brodziak, 2017, pp. 430–431). 
Another, similar, situation occurs in Germany, where the Embryo Protection Act (Gesetz 
zum Schutz von Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgesetz – ESchG) applies. This act is carefully 
presented in the opinion of the German Ethics Council, which states: “The Embryo Protection 
Act contains specific provisions on the formation of chimeras and hybrids only in Section 7: 
 Section 7 
(1) prohibits the creation of a number of entities, while Section 7
(2) provides for a ban on certain transfers.
Under Section 7(1) the following, and hence also attempts at the following, are punishable
offences:
1. Uniting embryos with differing genetic information to form a group of cells using at least
one human embryo;
2. Combining a human embryo with a cell that contains different genetic information from that
of the embryo’s cells and is capable of further differentiation with that embryo; or
3. Creating an embryo capable of differentiation by fertilization of a human egg with the sperm
of an animal or by the fertilization of an animal egg with human sperm” (Translation cited from
the opinion of the German Ethics Council, 2011, p. 37).
 The German act uses the title in section 7 – “Chimären und Hybridbildung” which means 
“The creation of chimeras and hybrids”. While there is no clear assignment to each type of 
organism, there is at least clarity about what the German legislator considers a chimera and 
hybrid to be. It is rather obvious to rate this solution as better than in Spain, but if we analyse 
the cited opinion of the German Ethics Council, there are some other interesting aspects. Page 
50 of the work states that the transfer of an animal organ into a human body is not a punishable 
offence, and this is clear, given that there is no human embryo involved. However, from a 
biological standpoint, after transplanting an animal organ into a human, that human technically 
becomes a chimera (Huther, 2009, p. 2). That is just one situation where the law clearly 
simplifies or even reduces the meaning of a word, though this is not necessarily a bad thing. In 
addition, as the German legal act proves, the legislator can even make his intent at least readable 
to some point without definition. While chimeras and hybrids are not defined, the reader of the 
law can understand exactly what types of research are banned. I consider this definition as 
technically a silent approach, although the rules dedicated to mixed beings makes regulation 
much more accessible. It is also worth noting that, in the practice of interpretation, it is assumed 
that a group of rules can be used to decode the legislator’s intent with good results and to 
construct a legal definition.7 
A completely opposite method to the silent approach is a wide legal definition. From the 
point of view of legal philosophy, this way of defining words should be termed an axiological 
definition, as Andrzej Malinowski states.8 Those definitions have an extensive range because 
7 For an example of this concept in practice, see file reference of the judgment: 2004 1CK 178/03 of Polish 
Supreme Court. 
8 “Axiological definitions (or in the other words: by postulates) comes down to indicating postulates that should 
pass every designation of defined name. If said object passes every postulate, then this is a designation of defined 
name, and if it does not pass even one, then this not a designation of defined name. There can be one postulate or 
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the legislator specifies certain postulates that elements of reality should pass in order to fall 
under the legal definition.  
The first example of an axiological definition is in the Polish Act on Infertility Treatment 
(Ustawa z dnia 25 czerwca 2015 r. o leczeniu niepłodności (Dz.U. 2015 poz. 1087). Definitions 
of chimera and hybrid are set out in Article 2, which contains a statutory glossary: 
“Chimera” – a group of cells built from cells [of] differing genotypes originating in more than 
two specimens of the same species or different species, where one of the species is human. 
“Hybrid” – a cell or group of cells formed from [human – author’s addition] reproductive cells 
and animal reproductive cells. 
As we can see, these definitions are rather wide and do not cover only an aspect of creating 
mixes of human and animal cells, but also experiments with more than two human “parents” 
for cells. A later part of the regulation, Article 25, bans the creation of chimeras and hybrids. 
The proposed definitions have one obvious advantage – they cover every, or almost every, 
possible case of hybrids and chimeras. There is not much room to discuss qualifying a new 
human-animal group of cells (in other words, every organism), and, in this way, we achieve 
clarity. On the other hand, such a rigorous and very general definition can slow down the 
development of biotechnologies based on interspecies creations. There are, at least, some 
aspects of creating chimeras or hybrids that are generally not considered to be highly unethical, 
such as combining a very low dosage of human cells with animal cells to analyse the 
development of diseases. 
Another country that has taken the route of using a similarly wide definition is Switzerland, 
where the Federal Act on Medically Assisted Reproduction (Federal Act of 18 December 1998 
on Medically Assisted Reproduction <Reproductive Medicine Act, RMA>) claims in its Article 
2 that; “chimera formation means the fusion of totipotent cells from two or more genetically 
different embryos. Embryonic cells are totipotent if they are capable of developing into any 
type of specialised cell” and “hybrid formation means causing a non-human sperm cell to 
penetrate into a human ovum, or a human sperm cell into a non-human ovum”. In addition, 
Article 1 of the Federal Act on Medically Assisted Reproduction states that the regulation 
concerns humans, so “chimera” or “hybrid” in this case merges with cases of using human DNA. 
Another resemblance is the fact that Article 36 bans the creation of chimeras and hybrids. While 
the wording in the Federal Act on Medically Assisted Reproduction is a bit more precise in the 
case of chimeras, it stills bears a strong similarity to the Polish act, with the same advantages 
and disadvantages. Significantly, Article 2 also gives a definition of totipotent cells, thereby 
smartly evading the problem of using a specialist word “totipotent” and, despite using an 
axiological definition, manages to create a more limited framework than the Polish act. 
Axiological definitions cover most of the possible aspects of creating mixed beings, which 
is useful in order to avoid doubts. In this case, there is no possible misunderstanding about what 
a chimera or hybrid is. It is beneficial from the perspective of potential legal liability (both civil 
and criminal), but I do not consider this option to be the best possible one. Axiological 
definitions about human-animal organisms solve a problem in too general a manner that blocks 
research. The legislator should think about creating space for scientific development rather than 
preventively banning all types of research in a situation when there is a general consensus that 
at least some experiments involving mixing human and animal DNA can be considered as 
ethical. 
The legislator can, however, take an alternative approach and use enumeration to express 
exactly his attitude to the numerous types of experiments involving mixing human and animal 
material. These definitions are referred to by Andrzej Malinowski as definitions by enumeration. 
many. The system of postulates should be consistent, and postulates should be unambiguous – passing these 
conditions allows postulates to be treated as an axiological definitions” (Malinowski, 2005, p. 229). 
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The American “Human-Animal Chimera Prohibition Act” (H.R.6131 – Human-Animal 
Chimera Prohibition Act of 2016, s. 52), as the title suggests, bans the creation of human-animal 
chimeras. Due to the strict regulations this act sets out, there should also be a precise definition 
of chimeric entities. As the act states in §1131 (“Definitions”), a human-animal chimera means: 
“(A) a human embryo into which a nonhuman cell or cells (or the component parts thereof) 
have been introduced to render the embryo’s membership in the species Homo sapiens uncertain, 
(B) a chimera human/animal embryo produced by fertilizing a human egg with nonhuman
sperm;
(C) a chimera human/animal embryo produced by fertilizing a nonhuman egg with human
sperm;
(D) an embryo produced by introducing a human nucleus into a nonhuman egg;
(E) an embryo containing at least haploid sets of chromosomes from both a human and a
nonhuman life form;
(G) a nonhuman life form engineered such that human gametes develop within the body of a
nonhuman life form;
(H) a nonhuman life form engineered such that it contains a human brain or a brain derived
wholly or predominantly from human neural tissues”.
Such a method of defining terms excels in covering many possible aspects, while also 
leaving possible space for other organisms that we can consider to be chimeras or hybrids from 
a natural sciences standpoint. We can look at this from two perspectives. In the first, we assume 
that the legislator is able to use the enumeration method to reasonably allow certain types of 
chimeric entities to be produced, i.e. those not classified as unethical or dangerous. On the other 
hand, we can argue whether, if a new “unethical” type of chimera emerges, then the regulation 
is incomplete and needs to be updated to once again cover the legislator’s initial intention. 
Another regulation that is built on enumeration is the British Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 <c 22>, s. 4.), which lists 
types of “admixed embryo” in its Article 4A, in addition to a prohibition on mixing human and 
animal gametes. This is an interesting name for entities mixing different DNA, because in this 
way the legislator covers both chimeras and hybrids, without confronting the potentially 
problematic distinction. In addition, the act sets out a list of human-animal beings, from which 
I cite a few examples: 
“an embryo created by replacing the nucleus of an animal egg or of an animal cell, or two 
animal pronuclei, with: 
(i) two human pronuclei,
(…)
(ii) one human pronucleus and one animal pronucleus,
any embryo not falling within paragraphs (a) to (d) that contain both nuclear or mitochondrial
DNA of a human and nuclear or mitochondrial DNA of an animal (“animal DNA”) but in which
the animal DNA is not predominant”.
Despite the rather harsh wording of this act, the British system does not ban all research on 
chimeras – “(…) a licence would be granted dependent on the nature of the species involved 
and/or the extent to which such modifications are apparent: for example, a pig hybrid with 
<some ‘human genes> would be acceptable” (Beyleveld et al., 2009, p. 658). What’s more, 
despite the enumeration, the legislator used one wider regulation in the end to have assurance 
that he did not leave out a situation whereby some unethical combination is not listed. However, 
the last case, where the embryo does not fall into the categories mentioned earlier, is still not 
an axiological definition, because of the specified precise criteria (combination of human and 
animal nuclear and mitochondrial DNA, where animal DNA is not predominant) as an addition 
to other mentioned possibilities of combining human and animal cells. 
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The last definition representing enumerative method comes from Article 2 of the Japanese 
Act on Regulation of Human Cloning Techniques (Act No. 146 of 2000).9 There are three 
groups defined: 
1. Human-Animal Hybrid Embryo,
2. Human-Animal Clone Embryo and
3. Human-Animal Chimeric Embryo.
To illustrate this method of legislation, I will cite only from the part dedicated to human-
animal chimeras: 
“Human-Animal Chimeric Embryo: Any of the following Embryos which is ― not a Human-
Human Chimeric Embryo, Animal Embryo or Animal-Human Chimeric Embryo (including 
each Embryo produced successively by single or multiple splitting of such an Embryo): 
(a) An Embryo produced as a result of aggregation of two or more Embryos (including an
Embryo produced as a result of aggregation of such an Embryo -4- and a Somatic or Embryonic
Cell) (b) An Embryo produced as a result of aggregation of an Embryo and a Somatic or
Embryonic Cell (c) An Embryo produced by Fusion between an Embryonic Cell with a cell
nucleus of an Embryo listed in (a) or (b) and a human or Animal Enucleated Egg”.
As we can see, in additional to defining the meaning of “Human-Human Chimeric Embryo”, 
the act insists on very detailed definitions divided into specific groups. I consider the Act on 
the Regulation of Human Cloning Techniques to be the most precise of the presented 
regulations, with a huge emphasis on not leaving any possible flaw in the regulation. The 
legislator knowingly enumerates which practices he regards as creating a chimera and hybrid, 
and even adds the category of a human-animal clone.  
I think this type of definition is the most useful because it is a comprehensive representation 
of the legislator’s intent and sets out a clear distinction of what is allowed and what is banned. 
In the presented situation, scientists have a plain overview of what research is permitted and, 
even more importantly, the type of research that is not completely prohibited. 
It is, of course, possible to combine the methods of making the legal definitions set out above. 
One example of this is from Canadian law, because the Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act (Assisted Human Reproduction Act <S.C. 2004, c. 2>) uses both axiological definition and 
definition by enumeration. In its Article 3, which introduces definitions, a chimera is defined 
as: 
“– an embryo into which a cell of any non-human life form has been introduced, 
– an embryo that consists of cells of more than one embryo, foetus or human being”.
This definition is rather general, and, indeed, a bit lacking from some possible perspectives
(like introducing human cells into animal embryos). Under the act, a hybrid is defined as: 
“– a human ovum that has been fertilized by a sperm of a non-human life form, 
– an ovum of a non-human life form that has been fertilized by a human sperm,
– a human ovum into which the nucleus of a cell of a non-human life form has been introduced,
– an ovum of a non-human life form into which the nucleus of a human cell has been introduced,
– a human ovum or an ovum of a non-human life form that otherwise contains haploid sets of
chromosomes from both a human being and a non-human life form”.
This throws up an interesting situation, because two close aspects of combining human and 
animal elements are resolved in two different ways – the concept of chimeras by an axiological 
definition while the concept of a hybrid through a definition by enumeration. In the case of 
chimera, the legislator decides to use a broad definition, but for hybrid he carefully sets out 
possible combinations leading to the creation of such a being. Both activities are banned in 
Article 5. 
9 I used translation provided by the Cabinet Secretariat. [Retrieved December 17, 2020] Available at: 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/htc.pdf 
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It is worth noting that issue of adequate definitions in legislation is discussed in the available 
literature. As Julian J. Koplin and Julian Savulescu observed, the creation of part-human 
chimeras by introducing human cells to animal embryos is not properly addressed in many legal 
systems. Even with definitions in legal acts, this method of producing chimeras falls between 
the gaps of existing legislation (Koplin et al., 2019, p. 40). Considering this observation, a 
question of the right way to define chimeras and hybrids is even more important. 
From this point, we can summarise the gathered types of definitions (or the lack thereof) and 
examples from various legal systems. As a reminder, I have determined three approaches to 
definitions: the silent approach (used in Germany and Spain); axiological definition (used in 
Poland and Switzerland) and enumerative definitions (USA, UK and Japan). In all the 
mentioned acts, except for Canada, the legislator decided to use only one of these approaches. 
The first way of handling the issue of chimeras or hybrids is simply not to define them and 
to use the silent approach. It is hard to rate this approach as positive, due to the very complicated 
status of these organisms. The terms chimera and hybrid, in the context of natural sciences or 
scientific experiments, are not common terms with an obvious meaning, so it is understandable 
that we should expect the legislator to offer at least an indication of how to interpret these words 
in a legal context. What is more, the average person probably does not know what a chimera is, 
because it is specialist knowledge. However, the German act on creating these entities can be 
considered as serviceable, because of listing punishable activities involving organisms, which 
helps to reconstruct the legislator’s intent. 
 Another method is an axiological definition, containing such a wide range of possible 
chimeras and hybrids that we can even consider them to cover almost every possible way of 
creating these entities in ways known to modern science. This approach is much clearer that the 
previous one and resolves the problem of understanding when dealing with human-animal 
organisms. A few general postulates about what is mixed show, in broad strokes, what will fall 
under the scope of the definition, without the need to clarify and discuss the several specific 
methods of mixing animal and human cells. However, as I noted, it can be a roadblock for 
developing biotechnology if there is no other regulation that perhaps loosens the strictness of 
the mentioned definitions (such as, for example, a provision that states when a certain type of 
research is not considered to involve chimeras). Another possible take is the use of a lex 
specialis that allows human-animal organisms to be created under very special conditions 
without generally undermining the rules on prohibiting them without extraordinary situations 
(like testing a new therapy). However, in this way, the legislator risks the dispersion of the legal 
system if it is later decided to introduce such a lex specialis. Lex specialis are more commonly 
used in international law. Regardless of deciding to use a different regulation to loosen a strict 
ban or a lex specialis, without them axiological definitions seem to have the potential to cause 
a negative impact on biotechnology. 
The last option for dealing with classifying chimeras and hybrids is definition by 
enumeration, which possibly works the best, as it clearly displays what should be considered 
as a chimeric or hybrid entity, and due, to this fact, we can ban it or allow certain methods of 
experimentation. As I mentioned, this is maybe not a perfect solution, but I consider it as the 
most adjusted to modern science and the reality of law. I highly favour definition by 
enumeration over the other two possible approaches due to its openness to scientific 
developments and as the amendment process is simpler, making it more responsive and better 
able to react to new ways of creating human-animal organisms (through the addition of a 
permissible or prohibited method versus the lack of a definition or a definition covering all 
experiments). 
Then there is the solution taken by Canada, with the possibility to adapt two approaches to 
definitions and even mix them in one act. I do not think there is any reason to introduce another 
category. More pertinent would be to ask how the legal definitions (or lack of them) resonate 
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with the world of science – as Aristotle stated in “Topics”, these definitions are really “a phrase 
signifying a thing's essence” – and to ask the extent to which they must resonate with science. 
Conclusions 
As I presented above, legal definitions, while useful, are not always a remedy to issues of 
meaning. They simply cannot cover all aspects of reality, and they themselves have limitations 
and flaws. These limitations and flaws are especially evident in situations of a very specific 
nature like when dealing with purely scientific terms. We can construct them differently, as a 
binding description (which in some cases, despite their role as guides, we must correctly 
interpret) or as an enumeration. When we discuss this in the context of biotechnology, there 
emerges another problematic aspect – terms like “chimera” or “hybrid” are highly specialised 
and not in use in common language, they come from scientific journals and ethical disputes. 
Placing them in legal acts always requires a simplification due to the nature of law. Legal 
definitions can be made by enumeration or postulates, but, in many cases, these would not be 
as detailed as their reflection in other sciences or reality. 
Law not only shapes reality, but often has to respond to it. In this respect, the law is generally 
playing catch-up and responds to changes in reality with an inevitable delay when attempting 
to cover aspects of the world that are already affecting our lives and are not sanctioned. 
However, the law makes boundaries for morally challenging issues. This is especially visible 
in the case of mixing human and animal DNA, when it can wholly ban this type of research or 
divide accepted and prohibited methods of creating new organisms. Definition is one of ways 
in which to achieve the goals of the legislator and clarify his intentions. When the legislator 
confronts the issue of chimeras and hybrids, he must reach for knowledge gathered in natural 
sciences, but cannot cite dozens of definitions from various branches. The legal definition must 
either be general (building upon passing postulates, like in the cited work of Malinowski) or 
must enumerate specific cases of mixing DNA. 
Whichever of these approaches to legal definitions is used in the case of chimeric or hybrid 
entities, it is still better than not attempting a legal definition at all. Where the legislator adopts 
the silent approach and resigns from using a definition at all (which forces meaning to be teased 
from other sources like legislative materials), this merely confuses the interpreter and results in 
attempts to decode meaning from jurisprudence or the doctrine. This method cannot be 
recommended. I consider general definitions, as used in the Polish or Swiss acts, as an attempt 
to prevent the controversial results of experiments before they are conducted. In some ways this 
works, but in other ways it is not fully understandable from either an ethical or a scientific point 
of view, especially taking into consideration the circumstances for creating chimeras or hybrids, 
i.e. to develop medicine, not to satisfy curiosity. No matter whether we analyse human-animal
organisms or other rapidly developing areas such as the use of artificial intelligence, the law
can struggle with matching current trends and challenges before they have an impact. The best-
known method for both controversial and specialist terms like chimeras and hybrids is
definition by enumeration. Enumeration gives scientists confidence that they can use one
method of creating chimeras and hybrids and cannot use another. It makes the intent of the
legislator a much clearer and compromises between the development of new, probably helpful
medical technology and pausing research that can be considered as dangerous or immoral.
One thing is certain, chimeras and hybrids cannot be overlooked by legislation. The 
importance of research on them will only continue to grow. Other things are not so certain, 
namely the point to which we can develop this type of research, and where the boundaries that 
cannot be crossed lie. Without well-designed regulations, we will only be guessing or suffering 
from the blindness of the legislator. 
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